Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, left, shakes hands with Chinese President Xi Jinping before their meeting at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, on Feb. 22, 2019.
Amr Nabil/AP Photo

“We all need to take a deep breath when it comes to Saudi-Chinese relations. Yes, they are strengthening, going beyond simple transactions of oil sales. Yes, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman surely appreciates not being asked by the Chinese about Jamal Khashoggi, just as the Chinese appreciate not hearing criticism about the treatment of Uyghurs from MBS,” Jeffrey Feltman, the former U.S. assistant secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, said in a statement. “But in the end, China is not concerned with Iran, which Saudi Arabia considers its #1 existential threat. The United States is concerned. Despite complications, the United States will remain Saudi Arabia’s essential partner, however uncomfortable that partnership often is for both sides.”

Mindful of the decades of U.S. blood and treasure squandered in Afghanistan and Iraq, China has adopted a resolutely neutral position on the multitude of regional tensions in the Middle East.

“China over the last several decades has had very balanced relationships with countries across the Middle East, whether it’s Saudi or Israel, or Iran or Turkey, and I just don’t see any deviation from that,” said Dawn Murphy, associate professor of national security strategy at the National War College. “They don’t want to be perceived as an external power taking sides.”

China’s tip-toe regional approach is calculated to provide Beijing access to needed resources and markets without risking the potential blowback of an overt challenge to traditional U.S. dominance in the Middle East.

“China is looking to increase its own influence, undermine American influence, [and] reap strategic gains from the region, but it is deliberately trying to do all of this in ways that don’t pick a fight with the United States to try to stay under Washington’s radar,” said Michael Singh, former senior director for Middle East affairs at the National Security Council and managing director at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

Where China does make noise that appeals to the Saudi leadership is in its aggressive rejection of foreign criticism of Riyadh’s human rights record.

“China does not mind what internal policies the Saudi government takes toward the Saudi population including minority groups or dissidents,” said Tong Zhao, senior fellow in the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and visiting research scholar at Princeton University.

Readouts of bilateral meetings between senior officials invariably include a ritual denunciation of such criticism.

Saudi officials appear grateful to Beijing for turning a blind eye to Riyadh’s rights record — which includes what Human Rights Watch calls “routine repression” of dissidents, independent clerics and women’s rights activists as well as “systematic discrimination” against religious minorities — and regularly return the favor by parroting Chinese government responses to criticism of China’s rights record.

“[We] staunchly support China’s legitimate position on such issues concerning core interests as Xinjiang, resolutely oppose any interference in China’s internal affairs and firmly safeguard the rights of all countries to choose their own political and human rights paths independently,” bin Salman told Xi during a phone call in April.

Biden’s Saudi Arabia visit may succeed in draining some of the rancor from the bilateral relationship. But it is unlikely to alter Riyadh’s willingness to leverage its deepening ties with China to pressure the U.S. to make its Saudi alliance an exception to the Biden administration’s avowed foreign policy guided by “American values, including a commitment to democracy, human rights and the rule of law.”

“Like during the Cold War … Saudi Arabia tries to play great powers off against one another.” Singh said. “If you are worried that the U.S. will drive too hard a bargain, a great way to mitigate that is to engage in flirtation with Moscow and Beijing, to tell every visiting American delegation how much more reliable the Russians are as an ally, or how the Chinese are offering you cooperation in this military area which the U.S. won’t like.”